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ROBERT W. HILLMAN*
Whatever Happened to the Market for Partners'
Desks? The Milberg Indictment as an Inquiry
into Accountability **
THE "PARTNERS' DESK" ONCE WAS A POPULAR OFFICE FIXTURE. A British innova-
tion of the late eighteenth century, this rather distinctive item of furniture featured
a large desktop placed on double pedestals and was typically placed in the middle
of a room rather than against a wall.' The placement of the desk allowed two peo-
ple to work facing each other.' The genius of the design allowed business partners
to conduct business face to face, often sharing a record book that served as a daily
log of partnership affairs.3 The partners' desk reinforced the view of partners as
colleagues and facilitated the mutual monitoring that is a premise underlying much
of partnership law.
The partners' desk is a relic of the past, rarely seen today and even more rarely
used. The demise of the desk may loosely track changes in the way partnerships,
especially law firms, operate. Larger firms with extensive branch offices and part-
ners unaware of even the names of most of their colleagues present the antithesis of
an environment in which this useful desk could be employed. Today, firms are
reluctant to ask summer associates to share offices, and the idea of an experienced
lawyer not having an individual workspace defined by walls is, in a word,
preposterous.4
All of which brings us to the indictment of the Milberg Weiss law firm and two
of its partners, an event that has received considerable media attention and critical
commentary.' In particular, concern has been expressed over the pre-indictment
Fair Business Practices Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. I am indebted
to the observations of Jeffrey T. Kraus for his informal comment on the demise of the partners' desk that
provided the theme for this article.
- © 2007 Robert W. Hillman.
1. See CHARLES BOYCE, DICTIONARY OF FURNITURE 219 (Checkmark Books 2d ed., 2001).
2. id.
3. See Jacob A. Stein, Cohan and Harris and the Law of Being on the Square, WASH. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 48.
4. But cf. Carter Ledyard & Millburn, LLP, http://www.clm.comrrecruiting.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2007)
(noting summer associates may share an office with first year associates); Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, http://
www.stroock.com/join-sp ment.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2007) (same, and explaining that this is a unique
"mentoring" opportunity).
5. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Milberg Weiss Law Firm, Two Senior Partners Indicted in
Secret Kickback Scheme Involving Named Plaintiffs in Class-Action Lawsuits (May 18, 2006), available at http:/
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tactics of the government in attempting to secure the cooperation of the firm,6 and
the effect of the indictment on the capacity and vigor of the plaintiffs' bar.7 The
merits of the prosecution and the motives of those who initiated the criminal pro-
ceeding will be debated for some time to come. The discussion is an important one
and quite appropriately will engage practitioners, commentators, and scholars rep-
resenting varying disciplines and holding diverse political views.
Independent of a discussion of the underlying wisdom and fairness of the prose-
cution of this particular firm, the case should be placed in the larger context of
well-established trends in the law of partnerships, specifically the reduction of vica-
rious accountability for missteps within a partnership.' Particularly in professional
services firms, the abridgement of accountability has reduced the need to monitor
the activities of colleagues in a firm.' This development has occurred without the
benefit of public debate or full consideration of the moral hazard problems that
arise when individuals combine their practices in a professional services firm in an
environment of reduced incentives to monitor the activities of each other.
When the Milberg prosecution is placed within the context of these recent
changes in partnership law, the indictment may be seen as an unsurprising re-
sponse to the diminution of partner accountability for the misconduct of col-
leagues in professional services firms.
I. THE LARGER CONTEXT
There has been a quiet transformation of partnership law over the last two decades.
Long a hallmark feature of partnership law, the derivative liability of partners for
transgressions of their colleagues' ° has been curtailed sharply through the emer-
gence of options to limit liability through simple and unilateral declarations of
nonresponsibility." Most notably, the limited liability partnership (LLP) has be-
come a near-ideal form of association for law firms desiring, as almost all do, to
/www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pr2006/06 1.html; see, e.g., Julie Creswell, U.S. Indictment for Big Law Firm in Class
Actions, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at Al.
6. See, e.g., Pamela A. MacLean, Defense Bar Smells Blood: They're Pushing Back Against DOI Tactics on
Legal and Political Fronts, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 2006, at S6 (stating that many critics believe that the Department
of Justice indicted Milberg Weiss because the firm refused to cooperate by waiving its privileges). See generally
Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311,
326-27 (2007); Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of
Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Beth Bar, Volume of Class Action Suits Falls in First Half of 2006, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 31, 2006, at 5.
8. See Robert W. Hillman, Law, Culture, and the Lore of Partnership: Of Entrepreneurs, Accountability, and
the Evolving Status of Partners, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 799 (2005) [hereinafter Hillman, Lore of
Partnership].
9. Id. at 801.
10. See, e.g., UNIF. P'sHiP ACT § 17 (1914) (imposing joint and several liability for wrongful act or breach
of trust by partner).
11. See Hillman, Lore of Partnership, supra note 8, at 799-802. See generally Jennifer J. Johnson, Limited
Liability for Lawyers: General Partners Need Not Apply, 51 Bus. LAW. 85, 92-112 (1995).
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limit potentially staggering liabilities in the post-Enron environment of increasing
perils for professional service firms. 2
The limited liability partnership and its close relative, the limited liability com-
pany (LLC), have developed in a protected environment characterized by the ab-
sence of meaningful debate on the desirability of limiting the liability of those who
provide professional services. Although some courts that oversee the legal profes-
sion greeted the development of the LLP with trepidation, early concerns have di-
minished as opting for limited liability has become the norm within the legal
profession. 3 Indeed, clients may wonder whether they would be served well by law
firms displaying insensitivity to their own liability issues by retaining the liability
structure of classic partnership law. 4
Given the growth in the size of firms and the proliferation of branch offices,
members of law firms properly view the prospect of derivative liability with alarm
and seek ways to limit their financial exposure for the missteps of their colleagues.'"
Lateral mobility within the profession only exacerbates this concern as rapid law
firm membership changes 6 make it increasingly difficult to monitor activities of
others in the firm. 7 The very real concern over extended liability in the large firm
context was well captured in this observation: "I'm not sure that [opposing LLPs on
the lack of accountability ground] is particularly realistic in the modern business
12. See, e.g., UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997) (stating tort or contract obligation of partnership is solely
the obligation of the partnership, and a partner is not liable for such an obligation solely by virtue of being a
partner). See generally ROBERT W. HILLMAN, ALLAN W. VESTAL & DONALD J. WEIDNER, THE REVISED UNI-
FORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 179-90 (2006).
13. Kentucky offers a revealing illustration. In 1995, the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to adopt a rule
that would allow lawyers to practice through LLPs because the justices "[didi not agree that lawyers can so limit
their liability." See In re Order Amending Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules of the
Supreme Court, Ky. 95-1 (Sept. 22, 1995). Five years later, the court shifted course and allowed law firms to
organize as LLPs provided they maintained specified levels of malpractice insurance. See Ky. Sup. CT. REP.
§ 3.024 (West 2000). See generally James C. Seiffert et al., Kentucky Supreme CourtApproves the Practice of Law
in Limited Liability Entities, 64 BENCH & BAR 53 (2000).
14. The LLP form has proven particularly popular with large firms. See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Organi-
zational Choices of Professional Services Firms: An Empirical Study, 58 Bus. LAW. 1387, 1394 (2003) [hereinafter
Hillman, Organizational Choices]. Some prominent firms initially expressed reluctance to convert to LLP status
for fear of the signal the move would send to clients. Id. at 1401. The lessons of Enron, however, removed
whatever doubts they may have had about the wisdom of limiting liability. See Cravaths Goes Limited as LLP
Wave Gathers Force, LEGAL WK., Apr. 3, 2003, http://www.legalweek.comArticles/l14006 (quoting Cravaths'
presiding partner: "Law firms in New York have only had the LLP option available to them for nine years and it
has taken time for the courts and clients to get used to the idea. In addition, there is no question that the high
level of litigation following Enron and Arthur Andersen has been a factor.").
15. Cf. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 710 (7th
Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("Unlimited liability and profit-sharing give each partner an interest in
monitoring ... those other partners who are shirking or otherwise not carrying their part of the load."). See
Hillman, Lore of Partnership, supra note 8, at 799-804.
16. See Paula A. Patton, Lateral Moves Now Part of Landscape; How Paradigm Shift Impacts the Profession,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 2001, at S5.
17. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Reputation: Looking for the Good Lawyer, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 549,
567 (1998).
VOL. 2 NO. 2 2007
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE MARKET FOR PARTNERS' DESKS?
environment, where people can be doing things right next door via e-mail that you
have no idea what they're doing."" s
The difficulty of monitoring conduct, however, is not in itself a sufficient excuse
for the failure to monitor. The core question is this: as between "innocent" mem-
bers of a firm and third parties who are harmed, who should bear the costs that
arise when a few professionals within a firm transgress the limits established by law
and professional ethics? Without adequately addressing the issue, state law has
provided the answer by sanctioning the development of limited liability vehicles
that effectively protect members of a firm from liability in law for the missteps of
their colleagues. Federalism issues aside, this is the context in which the propriety
of federal action in the form of the Milberg indictment should be considered.
II. BEFORE THE INDICTMENT: WHERE WERE THE PARTNERS?
Media accounts suggest that in the months immediately prior to the filing of the
indictment, Milberg's partners were informed by firm management of the status of
the investigation. 9 This reportedly was done through a string of partner meetings
offering incremental enhancements of information that did not fully apprise the
partners of the seriousness of the matter until the final stages.2" If the accounts are
true,2' they offer an amazing story of partner passivity in the face of information
that key participants in the firm together with the firm itself were likely to be
charged with criminal wrongdoing:
A partner named Elaine Kusel asked him directly: Had the investigation
reached the next "phase"? Had a draft indictment of the firm been sent to
Washington? Taylor acknowledged that it had. "At that point, there was a shock
wave in the room," recalls a former partner. As the crisis deepened, a few law-
yers talked about rallying the partnership's rank and file to challenge Weiss
themselves. But ultimately, no one had the stomach to rush the cockpit. Says
one former partner: "It was Mel's world, and everyone else just lived in it."22
The statement that it was "Mel's world" is extraordinary in the departure it sug-
gests from a classic view of what it means to be a partner. A partnership, the
statute informs us, is an association of two or more persons to carry on a business
18. Interview by Cheryl Glaser with Paul Martinek, Editor-in-Chief, Lawyer's Weekly, MARKETPLACE, Mar.
21, 2002, available at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/2002/03/21_mpp.html.
19. See Peter Elkind, The Fall of America's Meanest Law Firm, FORTUNE, Nov. 3, 2006, available at http://
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune archive/2006/11/13/8393127/index.htm?postversion=2006110316.
20. See id.
21. It is again worth emphasizing that media accounts may or may not be accurate. The accounts are used
here not as truthful renditions of facts but rather for what they may suggest more broadly about the behavior
of law partners generally.
22. Elkind, supra note 19.
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as owners,23 which suggests an egalitarian model of the partnership as a relation-
ship among co-equals.24 If that were truly the case with this firm, why would any
partner faced with the prospect of an investigation of the firm that may lead to a
criminal indictment fail to demand answers from the partners at the center of the
investigation?
That the firm may have been perceived to be "Mel's world" offers something of
an answer by revealing that the partners viewed themselves more as employees than
as partners. Assuming the account of partner passivity is accurate, it is doubtful
that the response of Milberg's partners is significantly out of line with the evolving
norms of practice in law firms. Partners may be equal in the eyes of the law, but
many firms reject the egalitarian view of law in favor of tiered or hierarchical part-
nerships in which both management and power are highly centralized." Firm prac-
tice has evolved in a way that many, and perhaps most firms now reject what their
partners regard as outmoded legal structures in favor of centralization and profes-
sionalization of firm management.26
To a large extent, centralized management and tiered partnerships are a by-
product of size. Centralization of authority avoids the chaos of governance that the
egalitarian model may encourage. 2 Even small firms, however, may reject the egali-
tarian norms of partnership law and vest disproportionate power and economic
interest in a single partner or small group of partners. Such a development is
particularly common when one partner acts as "rainmaker, '29 while other partners
exist solely to service the clients brought into the firm by the dominant partner.3"
All of this suggests that we should not be shocked if anxious Milberg partners
did not press for answers to questions that intruded into "Mel's world." To under-
stand their passivity, on the other hand, is not to suggest either that their response
is appropriate or that their conduct should be encouraged by partnership law.
23. See UNIF. P'SHIp ACT §§ 101(6), 202 (1997); UNIF. P'sHip ACT § 6 (1914).
24. See Hillman, Organizational Choices, supra note 14, at 797-99.
25. Robert W. Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm: Partnership Law, Corporate Law, and Private Ordering
within Closely-Held Business Associations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 171, 183 [hereinafter Hillman, The Bargain in the
Firm].
26. Another manifestation of a rejection of the egalitarian premise underlying partnership is the expanded
use of the "nonequity" or "salaried" designation for individual who have the status of partners in name only.
See Hillman, Lore of Partnership, supra note 8, at 817-22.
27. See Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm, supra note 25, at 183-85.
28. Cf. wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 273 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that small partnerships are
"frequently vulnerable to domination by a single partner or a small group of partners").
29. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining rainmaker as "[a] lawyer who generates a large
amount of business for a law firm . . .").
30. See Hillman, The Bargain in the Firm, supra note 25, at 186-88.
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III. THE INDICTMENT
The indictment of Milberg was accompanied by considerable fanfare and attendant
publicity." A message was being delivered: "The government understands that it
has launched a nuclear weapon, and that there will be collateral damage to inno-
cent third parties. The government is sending a message ... that it views the abuses
alleged in the indictment as systematic and widespread." 2
The essence of the Milberg indictment is that the firm and two of its senior
partners paid individuals, who were also indicted, in excess of $11 million to serve
as named plaintiffs." The net benefit to the firm is alleged to exceed $200 million
in legal fees paid in 150 class action and derivative action lawsuits over a period of
two decades. The charges include the usual allegations of conspiracy, obstruction
of justice, mail and wire fraud, and cover-up."
Of course, it is not relevant to the criminality of the conduct that the payment of
"kickbacks" may have been prompted by antiquated and unrealistic limitations on
compensating lead plaintiffs." In theory, a lead plaintiff in a securities class action
monitors the lawyers and represents class members by providing testimony in dep-
osition and trial.36 For these services, the lead plaintiff may claim only a reimburse-
ment of actual expenses and may recover no more than her proportionate interest
in the recovery,37 which raises the question why anyone would have even the slight-
est interest in serving as a lead plaintiff.3
A case may be made for reforming existing approaches to class representation,
and some efforts already have been made in this regard.39 That said, circumvention
31. See supra note 5.
32. Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Patti Waldmeir, Indictment or Law Firm Fuels Debate Over Approach to
White-Collar Crime, FIN. TIMES, May 24, 2006, at 5 (quoting Timothy Coleman, a lawyer with the law firm of
Dewey Ballantine LLP).
33. First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, David J. Ber-
shad, Steven G. Schulman, Seymour M. Lazar, and Paul T. Seizer, CR 05-587(A)-DDP (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2004),
available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/clssactns/usm/brg5l806bind.pdf [hereinafter
Indictment].
34. See id.
35. See id. at 10-24.
36. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4)). See generally Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053,
2057- 58 (1995) (arguing that an institutional investor would more likely serve as "litigation monitor" if made
lead plaintiff, but claiming that judicial practices discouraged such assignment).
37. See, e.g., Jennifer O'Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act: If It Looks
Like a Securities Fraud Claim and Acts Like a Securities Fraud Claim, Is It a Securities Fraud Claim?, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 325, 335-36 (2004).
38. Obviously, some lead plaintiffs are motivated by a desire to secure justice and are unconcerned about
the lack of an economic incentive to serve in this role.
39. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-641 (1999) (establishes procedures for certification of classes and directs the
court to set up a discovery schedule and conduct a certification hearing); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-23 (2003)
(establishes detailed procedures to govern class actions including initiation, dismissal, transfer of settlements,
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is no substitute for reform. Any firm that chooses to disregard norms for compen-
sating class representatives not only raises questions concerning the adequacy and
motives of the class representatives in the cases they bring, but also secures a com-
petitive advantage over firms that operate within the boundaries defined by law.
IV. THE FALLOUT: ARE THE EFFECTS LASTING?
A law firm under indictment is poorly positioned to compete for and retain lead
counsel positions in major class action cases. Predictably, early reactions to the
Milberg indictment put the firm's position as lead counsel in jeopardy in a number
of cases in which it enjoyed that position.4
It is reasonable to assume that Milberg will have difficulty surviving the fallout
from the indictment, even if the firm is not ultimately convicted. Indeed, the de-
struction of the firm may be the real purpose behind the indictment. In the eyes of
its critics, the Milberg firm stands for all that is with wrong with class action litiga-
tion."' They believe, mistakenly, that eliminating a leading law firm will address the
deficiencies of a mass tort system sorely in need of reform.42 The view is short-
sighted because the abuses of tort litigation are best addressed through an overhaul
of law, not a weakening of the actors who seek to exploit its weaknesses.43
If the Milberg indictment truly is a "nuclear weapon,' it is of the tactical rather
than the strategic variety. Undoubtedly, the destruction of the firm would provide
some short-term relief to corporate defendants who might otherwise be the subject
of its attention. The respite, however, would be temporary. Other firms will move
quickly to fill the void. Former Milberg lawyers will establish their practices in new
firms,4" many of which undoubtedly will be strengthened by the demise of a com-
petitor as powerful as Milberg once was.46
To be sure, Milberg enjoys goodwill as a firm over and above that of its individ-
ual lawyers. Given the firm's reputation, some would say notoriety, simply identify-
ing Milberg as lead counsel may enhance the settlement value of a case. The recent
notice and judgments); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001--.050 (Vernon 2007) (provides for
adoption of rules to regulate the award of attorneys' fees in class actions and requires trial courts to rule on
whether state agencies have jurisdiction prior to certifying a class action).
40. See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 19 (describing the loss of cases and exodus of partners following the
indictment); Leigh Jones, Milberg Dwindles, Questions Multiply, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 2006, at I (describing the
departure of ten partners and decisions of some clients to replace the firm as lead counsel).
41. See Timothy L. O'Brien, Behind the Breakup of the Kings of Tort, N.Y. TiMEs, July 11, 2004 § 3, at 1; see
also Timothy L. O'Brien & Jonathan D. Glater, Robin Hoods or Legal Hoods?, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, at BUI.
42. See O'Brien & Glater, supra note 41.
43. Cf. John T. Nockelby, Access to Justice: Can Business Co-Exist With the Civil Justice System?, 38 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 1009, 1011-15 (2005).
44. See Kirchgaessner & Waldmeir, supra note 32.
45. See Editorial, Very Rough Justice, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at A12 (noting that many of the Milberg
partners may simply move their practices elsewhere and that some "could retain their yachts and private air-
planes, just as many of the offending Andersen partners did").
46. Short-term dislocations associated with moving practices are normal, but in an era of lawyer mobility,
lawyers and firms have learned to minimize the costs arising from lateral movement.
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departures of key partners, however, may already have diminished at least some of
this goodwill. 7 Especially noteworthy on this score was the loss in 2004 of William
Lerach, variously described by the New York Times as the "king of torts"4' and "the
powerful class-action attorney both feared and loathed in executive suites across the
country.
49
The survival of a vigorous class action bar does not hinge on the fate of Milberg.
Even if faced with an adverse outcome in the prosecution, its unindicted lawyers
will adapt, either as members of a wounded and rebuilding Milberg or as lawyers
practicing elsewhere.
V. THE LESSONS
Three decades of lawyer mobility have aptly demonstrated that although law firms
may be fragile, law practices are resilient by reason of their portability. The imposi-
tion of the "death sentence" of an indictment is more sizzle than steak when ac-
countability for the transgressions leading to the sanction is limited to a small
minority of partners. Even great firms fail, but lawyers' practices are difficult to
extinguish.
The case against Milberg raises once again questions concerning what it means
to be a "partner" in a large professional services firm. That it means something less
than it once did in terms of accountability is partly due to the receptiveness of
legislatures to limiting vicarious liability in professional services firms through the
creation of limited liability partnerships.5" The movement towards limiting liability
of professionals associated in firm practice has occurred during a period in which
the Enron,51 WorldCom," and other corporate scandals" have raised questions
whether law and accounting firms are exercising sufficient diligence in the dis-
charge of their professional responsibilities. 4
47. See generally Jones, supra note 40, at 1 (stating that "[o]f Milberg Weiss' 118 full-time partners, 90
came to the firm in 1998 or later .... Furthermore, many of [the] partners previously with the firm before
former partner William Lerach formed his own practice now work for Lerach.").
48. See O'Brien, supra note 41.
49. See O'Brien & Glater, supra note 41.
50. See, e.g., Thomas E. Rutledge, Limited Liability (Or Not): Reflections on the Grail, 51 S.D. L. REV. 417,
422-23 (2006).
51. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability of Professional Firms After Enron, 29 1. CORP. L. 427, 438
(2004).
52. Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Services Liability Trends, 742 PLI LITIG. & ADMIN. PRACT.: LITIG.
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 237, 241 (2006).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role For Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48
VILL. L. REv. 1097 (2003); Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification,
Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167 (2003).
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Other trends support the movement away from accountability. Foremost among
these is the growth in the sizes of law and accounting firms." Delegation of man-
agement authority to managing partners or committees may be a necessary re-
sponse to larger firm memberships, but delegation also lessens the role of partners
in monitoring the actions of each other.56 Moreover, the culture of lawyer mobility
that has prompted the courts to describe the revolving door as "a modern-day law
firm fixture"57 fosters a short-term outlook in which at least some partners do not
view themselves as long-term stakeholders in their firms.58
And why does any of this matter? When partners do not view themselves as
long-term stakeholders, they have little incentive to monitor closely the acts of their
colleagues, particularly when the law embraces efforts to limit vicarious liability for
the misdeeds of fellow partners. Thus, rather than taking steps to insure proper
conduct by firm members, the principal task of management becomes one of dam-
age control if it is made aware of misconduct, not by its own monitoring efforts but
through complaints by third parties, typically clients or government investigators.59
All of which would suggest that perhaps there is a need for a revived market for
partners' desks.
55. See Scott A. Fredricks, The Irresponsible Lawyer: Why We Have an Amoral Profession, 11 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 133, 145-46 (2006); Amy Shapiro, Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?: Auditing Regulation and Clients'
Incentives, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1029, 1049-50 (2005).
56. See, e.g., Ethan S. Burger, Regulating Large International Accounting Firms: Should the Scope of Liability
for Outside Accountants Be Expanded to Strengthen Corporate Governance and Lessen the Risk of Securities Viola-
tions?, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2005); Macey & Sale, supra note 54, at 1172.
57. Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1180 (N.Y. 1995).
58. See Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of Doctrine, 22 CAR-
Dozo L. REV. 51, 63-64 (2000).
59. See, e.g., Anthony Lin, Ex-Greenberg Tax Chief Resigns Over Kickbacks, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 2006, at I
(noting the firm's response to kickbacks to partner was to conduct an investigation that ultimately resulted in
the resignation of the partner).
VOL. 2 NO. 2 2007
